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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No.
v.

: Court of Appeals No. 890396-CA

KEELEY L. ROWE,

: Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously
interpret federal law and ignore Utah law by concluding that the
mere status of being a "party guest" in a third-party's home
"vests" the guest with standing to challenge a search of the home?
Did the majority decision adopt, in effect, a "legitimately on the
premises" test for standing in conflict with federal and Utah case
law?
2. Did the majority of the court of appeals erroneously
conclude

that

unequivocal

the

and

state

decisive

must

prove

evidence;"

abandonment
and

did

by

the

"clear,
majority

erroneously apply a subjective standard in evaluating whether
abandonment occurred by improperly requiring the state to prove
that defendant did not abandon the property

"to avoid self-

incrimination? "
3. Did the majority of the court of appeals ignore Utah
precedent and erroneously conclude that the "exclusionary rule" is

applicable to a procedural violation of the nighttime search
warrant provision, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (1990)?

Did the

majority of the court of appeals ignore Utah and federal case law
and

erroneously

conclude, without

factual

support, that the

officers acted in bad faith in executing contemporaneously a search
warrant for a home with their valid nighttime arrest warrant of its
owner?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is
State v. Keelev Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 8,
1991), a copy of which is contained in the addendum to this
petition.
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
On February 8, 1991, the court of appeals issued its
split decision reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress evidence . The state timely filed requests for
and was granted a stay of remittitur by the court of appeals and an
extension of time in which to file this petition by the Utah
Supreme Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to consider the

petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990) and
§ 78-2a-4 (1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of any provisions upon which the state
relies is included in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant,

Keeley

Laursen

Rowe,

was

charged

with

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),
(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 10).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant executed on a third-party's
home (R. 28-31, 32-41).

On March 17, 1989, the court entered a

written order denying the motion (R. 60-1).
A bench trial commenced on March 21, 1989 (R. 50, 62-65).
During trial, defendant renewed her motion to suppress (T. 7-8,
104-05).

The trial court denied the motion (T. 108). Defendant

was convicted as charged (R. 65, T. 181).

Defendant directly

appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 85-6).
The matter was orally argued to the court of appeals on
June 13, 1990.

On February 8, 1991, the court of appeals, in a

split decision, reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress on the basis that the search warrant, for the third-party
home in which defendant was a party guest, was defective for having
authorized a nighttime search.

Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.

The majority found that exclusion of any evidence seized was
mandated and reversed defendant's conviction.

Ld. at 17.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state accepts the statement of the facts contained in
the opinion of the court of appeals with the following additions.
On October 6, 1989, a confidential informant told the
police

that

Stan

Swickey,

the

individual

whose

home

was

subsequently searched, had a large quantity of methamphetamine and
marijuana at his home in Leeds, Utah, and had offered to sell the
-3-

informant whatever he wanted (R. 56-7; T. 12).

Based on this

information and prior police monitored drug purchases from Swickey,
an arrest warrant for Swickey and a search warrant for his home
were obtained on the night of October 7, 1989 (T. 9-12, 14). The
search warrant authorized the officers to execute it at night and
without announcing their presence (R. 57). 1 Within a few hours,
the officers entered the Swickey home to arrest Mr. Swickey and
execute the search warrant (T. 15, 18).
Upon entering the home, the officers unexpectedly
encountered eight other individuals in the home for what appeared
to be a gambling party (T. 16).

Defendant was standing in the

kitchen and the others were seated around a table in the living
room (T. 16, 21). Drugs were in plain view in a cup on the living
room table (T. 26, 57-8, 126).2

The officers arrested Swickey

pursuant to the arrest warrant and informed him of the search
warrant (T. 17, 22).
The remaining party guests, including defendant, were
told that they were free to leave the premises (T. 30). Defendant
asked if she could get her shoes.

An officer accompanied her to

the bedroom, where
[fjrom a pile of clothing next to the file
cabinet she — in which this purse was a part
of that pile, she removed her shoes in that
1

The substantive validity of the search warrant has not been
challenged at trial or on appeal. The only issues raised relate to
the warrant's authorization of a no-knock and nighttime entry.
2

Edwin Davis was arrested for possession of the drugs in his
cup. He was tried with defendant and convicted of the lesser
included offense of resorting (T. 181).
-4-

pile.
In that pile there were some pants,
some women's temple garments, several other
items. She picked those up and her shoes up,
and I asked her, "Is that everything of yours
in this room? She said that was, and exited
the room and we permitted her to leave.
(T. 30-31).
After defendant left, the officers conducted the search
of the home (T. 31, 44). Drugs were found throughout the house,
including a pile of methamphetamine on the dresser in the room from
which defendant retrieved her shoes. A vial of methamphetamine was
found in the purse on the floor. When subsequently questioned by
the police, defendant stated that she had been "ripping off"
Swickey during the party by filling the vial from the supply of
methamphetamine on the dresser without Swickey's knowledge and
without payment to him (T. 35, 49).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE STATUS OF BEING AN INVITED GUEST
CONFERS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF
A SEARCH WARRANT FOR A THIRD PARTY HOME.
At trial and on appeal, the state argued that defendant
lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of the search warrant for
the Swickey home since she was only a party guest in the home.
Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14; Br. of Appellee at 6-12.

In a

split decision rejecting this argument, a majority of the court of
appeals concluded that
defendant's status as an invited guest in the
home vested her with a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the home and she thereby gained
sufficient standing to challenge the validity
-5-

of the
search.

search

warrant

Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.

and

the

resulting

Despite the court's use of the

accepted terminology of "reasonable expectation of privacy," the
majority's opinion amounts to no more than an application of the
formerly rejected "legitimately on the premises" test for standing
and is, therefore, in conflict with federal and Utah case law.
Defendant did not produce any evidence that she had a
greater expectation of privacy in the home than any of the other
seven party guests present when the police entered the home (T. 3031, 96-97, 105-107) . The court of appeals agreed that defendant
was simply an invited social guest in the home and that there was
no evidence that "would lead to the conclusion that she intended,
or might have been invited, to remain overnight on the night of the
search."

Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
In concluding

that this

"invited guest" status was

sufficient to establish standing, the majority relied exclusively
on Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684 (1990), and Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).3

In Olson, the Supreme Court held

that an overnight guest had a sufficient expectation of privacy in
his host's home such that an arrest warrant was required to enter

3

Rawlings, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978),
reaffirms that the proper test for standing is whether the
aggrieved party had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
area searched.
448 U.S. at 104. While the court of appeals
determined the issue of standing solely on federal law, it is clear
that Utah cases have consistently applied the Rakas standard. State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990); State v. Iacono, 725
P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334,
1335 (Utah 1984).
-6-
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6 29,

is i1 1 u

a s e a r c h warrant:

LOJ 1111,1

1 n

home); Crisp v. State, 195 Ga.App. 786, 395 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1990)
(mere presence in a hotel room when it is searched is insufficient
to establish any expectation of privacy); People v. Harris, 797
P.2d 816, 817 (Colo. App. 1990) (a social guest, as opposed to an
overnight guest, does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the host's apartment).

See also United States v. Donnes, 752

F.Supp 411, 417 (D.Wyo. 1990) (a defendant who had lived in the
searched home continuously for several months, had left furniture
and belongings in it, and had padlocked the home when he left it
sometime prior to the search, had a reasonable expectation of
privacy to contest its search); People v. Murray, 565 N.Y.Supp.2d
212, 213 (A.D.2 Dept. 1991) (a defendant had standing to challenge
his warrantless arrest in his girlfriend's apartment where he was
spending the night); People v. Olson, 198 111.App.3d 675, 144
111.Dec. 806, 556 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1990) (a defendant who was
sleeping in a bed in his underwear had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in another's hotel room); State v. Carter, 22 Conn.App.
118, 576 A.2d 572, 574-75 (1990) (a defendant who was "clearly more
than a transient houseguest" had standing to challenge the search
of his host's apartment); State v. Corpier, 793 S.W.2d 430, 436-37
(Mo. App. 1990) (a defendant who spent three to four nights a week
at a friend's apartment for "liaisons with his girlfriend" was more
than a casual guest or visitor and so had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the apartment); State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 413
(S.D. 1990) (a defendant had standing to challenge the search of
his girlfriend's trailer in which he was spending the night); State
-8-
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characteristics of overnight stays-, such as
showering, changing clothes, and the use of
toilet facilities, the distinction is really
more one of degree than of kind. For example,
the seclusion extended to a parent who pauses
to feed or diaper an infant while visiting
friends implies a reasonable expectation of
privacy, although the visit might be a short
one, and certainly less than an overnight
stay.
Visitors of comparatively short
duration may nap, change, u&t the toilet, or
dine without any expectation of interference
from, the world at large.
* T this
case,
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are

not uncommon for any individuals familiar with each other in a
home, especially when the apparent purpose of the gathering was to
casually gamble, drink and use drugs (T. 16). Further, the court's
conclusion that defendant left her purse in the bedroom because she
"felt secure" in the home is inconsistent with the evidence.

By

defendant's own admission, she was using the purse to secrete the
drugs which she was stealing from her host throughout the evening
(T. 35). By having the purse in the bedroom, she could more easily
accomplish her illegal activities since the methamphetamine she was
stealing was located on the dresser in the bedroom (T. 35).

A

legitimate expectation of privacy cannot be justified by subjective
hopes of concealing illegal conduct.

Rakas v. Illinois, 4 39 U.S.

128, 143 n.12 (1978).
The only distinction alluded to by the majority, between
defendant and the other party guests, is that defendant and Swickey
had

an

"intimate

relationship"

in the past

"which may have

continued to the time" of the search. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at
15.

But, the fact that such a relationship may have existed at

some time remote from the search is not relevant to the inquiry of
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Swickey's home on the night in question.

"Any other conclusion

would result in an overnight guest's having a permanently protected
fourth amendment interest in a place he or she once stayed, no
matter how remote in time." State v. Cortis, 465 N.W.2d at 139.
It is defendant who has the burden of establishing facts
supporting her claim of standing. Society of Prof. Journalists v.
-10-
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POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT
EVIDENCE
OF ABANDONMENT
MUST
BE
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE;
AND ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD
BY REQUIRING THAT "ABANDONMENT IN THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT SENSE" COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED IF
THE STATE PROVED THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT
ABANDON
THE
PROPERTY
TO
"AVOID
SELFINCRIMINATION."
While

a

party

guest

would

not

have

a

legitimate

expectation of privacy in the host's home, a guest could retain a
reasonable privacy interest in the guest's personal possessions in
the home.

Here, the state argued that any legitimate expectation

of privacy which defendant may have had in her purse, was abandoned
by defendant disclaiming ownership of it and leaving it on the
floor in the bedroom when she left the home prior to the police
commencing their search.
In rejecting the state's argument, the majority concluded
that the state must prove that a defendant abandoned any legitimate
expectation

of

privacy

by

"clear, unequivocal

and

decisive

evidence." While the issue is one of first impression in Utah, the
state would submit that the better and more consistent standard of
proof would be proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Only a minority of jurisdictions have directly determined
the

standard

abandonment.4

of

proof

applicable

to

a

determination

of

The court of appeals relied on Friedman v. United

A

The same holds true in evaluating standing. While Utah
clearly places the burden of establishing standing on a defendant,
no Utah case articulates the standard of proof. This omission
appears to be common in other jurisdictions as well.
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Do.eiy

a

subjective

determination,

it

is

in

conflict

with

the

overwhelmingly accepted view that
the test to be applied in determining whether
a person has abandoned property is an
objective one - the words used, the conduct
exhibited, and other objective facts such as
where and for what length of time the property
is relinquished and the condition of the
property.
O'Shauqhnessv v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379

(Fla.App. 1982).6

Accord United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir. 1989);
United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d
199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982); United
States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 99, 101 (D.Md. 1985).
While the majority opinion correctly stated that proof of
abandonment

is a factual determination

"inferred

from

'words

spoken, acts done, and other objective facts,'" a consideration of
the court's second false predicate makes clear that the majority
erroneously applied a subjective standard in assessing abandonment.
In concluding that the state failed to carry its burden of proof,
the court considered defendant's denial of ownership of the purse
and then stated:

5

The language quoted is dicta contained in a footnote
discussing the issue of the voluntariness of an abandonment
occurring in the context of prior illegal police conduct. Narian,
556 A.2d at 1161 n.4. Narian has not been cited or approved by any
other court.
6

The court of appeals cited O'Shaughessy but only in support
of its conclusion that a clear and convincing standard of proof was
appropriate.
-14-

Tli il r e p u d i a t i o n o f i i iterest In property
located in the bedroom is consiste* t. with a
conclusion of abandonment.
It J.S . t,
however, inconsistent with -» --onclu^ion of a
mere disclaimer of interest
i « '* c"- ' f ~
incrimination.
Rowe f

154 Utah

Adv

|

Th^"G r-rp...i:

it 1*

s: TirlfifJ hi! mini 1 ii,') most fourth amendment ribrindonment occurs
- ru - *

the s:i.qular reab^j. L;.
him^e 1 ' hv ;'^La „*.:*.; possess i or
ol

• * i r i ^.

reasoi

:i

qu try

;

oi nUieiwibe 11*11,

i

'

I I I liO c o u l d
ary with

.-

i i ' es

not * ne subjective
-* - - **

prejudiced by the sear

sc

- u tiaLaixu ^JL *.:

ncriminate

.nidi. * aiocarau , . f-^rPFt

longei

regan

erson

- * he propertx

p

S t a t e s v . MCKeniiuj

question

.T -c*-a4 ""r

;t:
•

r

J.JIO

-&arch.

f
i

^ ^ L x . v.*r. _ J 6; xe:Tsphcssis

*** original) .,
Furth€?r, t he ma jori ty u I th'-' C D U i, L of appea Is ' panel
factually

erred

i n nil ! \ • ouiihS id^ri i i defendant " M disclaimer of

ownership of the purse,
puisp was Ii ii1,!-,

i Pendant did nut a imp Jj Uonj il ii il •

i»;he physically left it on tho floor knowing tha \ a

search was to be conduolod ciftei: ,,,".! i departed,

Th, i s combination of

"words spoken and acts done" clearly established

Uiui dofend.nit.

cil-.jiiij1 ("iic-11 ,un « r e a s o n a b l e • * •• • * at ion c

n her purse prior

privacy

fo the search commencing. Ago

-itr^ no casp law t.o

support its contention that a disclaim*.' a

physic m I

i I • m | shir ^nt

w

"abandonment in tJiP fourth amenu-..^
-15-

n* - C M

*"nersi..p 'JUIIIIJI
; o e - not

iM

i i •)

cnst: Lute

Certiorari is appropriate on this issue as the Rowe
decision determines, as a matter of first impression in Utah, that
abandonment must be established by clear and convincing evidence in
light of the subjective intent of the defendant. This presents an
important question of law which should be settled by this Court.
Additionally, based on the facts of this case, the majority's
conclusion that defendant did not abandon her privacy interests "so
far depart[s] from the accepted and usual course of judicial"
analysis as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision."

Utah R. App. P. 46.
POINT III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED, IN
CONFLICT WITH UTAH PRECEDENT, THAT THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO A
PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME SEARCH
WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-5
(1990).
Both at trial and on appeal, defendant's only claim of
error in regards to the Swickey search warrant was that the
affidavit did not contain a sufficient basis to authorize either
the no-knock entry or the nighttime search.7

The majority of the

appellate

determination

panel

upheld

the

lower

court's

that

sufficient justification existed for an unannounced entry; but, the
appellate

court overruled

the magistrate's

conclusion

that a

nighttime search was permissible. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 1314.

7

Defendant also claimed that the search warrant contained the
wrong date. Both the trial and appellate courts summarily
discounted this argument.
-16-
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The concern of the statutory entry requirements is to
minimize the invasion of privacy which has already been authorized
by the issuance of the search warrant.

State v. Buck, 756 P. 2d

700, 703 (Utah 1988) (no-knock provision violation did not require
suppression where the violation did "not contribute to the invasion
of privacy").

Here, a greater invasion of privacy would have

occurred if the officers had validly arrested Swickey at night, but
secured his home until dawn when the search warrant could have been
executed. Such delay a would not have preserved any constitutional
rights, nor served any practical usefulness. .Id. at 702-03; State
v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (1987).
The
noncompliance

court
with

of
the

appeals'
nighttime

conclusion
search

that

written

provisions

requires

suppression of the evidence ignores Utah precedent and is in
conflict with federal law. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69
(Utah 1987) (despite an officer clearly acting outside of his
statutory geographical authority, suppression is "a remedy out of
all proportion to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining
justice while preserving individual liberties unimpaired"). Accord
United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d at 1125 (violation of nighttime
provision is procedural and does not require suppression; cited
with approval in Fixel), United States v. Shelton, 742 F.Supp.
1491,

1502-03

(D.Wyo.

1990)

(violation

of

nighttime

search

provision is statutory and does not require suppression; citing
Fixel as being in accord).

See also State v. Ford, 801 P.2d. 754,
-18-

764-66

(Or. 1990) (failure to comply with no-knock statutory

provision was excusable and did not violate the federal or state
constitution); Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421,
423-24 (1985) (suppression not appropriate remedy for technical
violations of procedural rules governing the execution of search
warrants); State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982)
(suppression

not

required

for violation

of

nighttime

search

provisions); Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378,
384-85 (1979) (suppression not required for violation of procedural
rules governing execution and return on search warrant).
The majority also concluded that the officers in question
had acted in bad faith in executing the search warrant at night.9
For purposes of this petition, the state will not fully brief this
issue but asserts that the conclusion that the officers acted in
bad faith reliance on the nighttime authorization for the search is
in conflict with the standards enunciated in State v. Fixel, 744
P.2d at 1368-69, and the cases cited therein.

9

Despite Judge Orme's appendix to the Rowe opinion in which
he questions the propriety of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, the court did not consider any state
constitutional issue of good faith. Rather, the majority opinion
is solely predicated on the federal criteria of United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
However, the state would submit that other than the "bad
faith" aspects enunciated in Fixel and the cases cited therein, a
Leon-type analysis would only be applicable if this Court found
that the violation in this case was of constitutional magnitude
such that exclusion of the evidence could
be considered.
Otherwise, the remedy for a procedural violation is limited to
"official sanctions, discipline, and/or civil and criminal
liability." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1369.
-19-

The majority opinion's conclusion, that a violation of
the entry requirements for execution of a search warrant is of
constitutional magnitude and "mandates" suppression, ignores and is
in direct conflict with Utah precedent• As such, it is appropriate
for review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons, the

state

respectfully

requests this Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

Q//~> day of April, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney Gerlejral

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee, was mailed, postage prepaid to Sheldon
R. Carter, attorney for respondent, 3325 North University Ave.,
Suite 200, Provo, Utah

84604, this 9^/? day of April, 1991.
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ADDENDUM

State v. Rowe

CODE • CO
154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
Provo, Utah
N.E, 122, 123 (1929); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, nably believed that the property sought could
257, 207 P. 1065, 1066 (1922). We believe, however, be easily destroyed or hidden or that harm to
that this position is unnecessary and substantially officers could result from notice. Following
conflicts with the purposes of the UUPC.
this language are two boxes that the affiant
3. If the trial court hears disputed evidence on the can check, and which were checked, to request
question of the decedent's signatory intent, the nighttime and "no-knock" authority. No
reviewing court should defer to the trial court's
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See In re other factual information supports these reqYowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312, 329, 285 P. 285, 294 uests.
The warrant was executed on a "no(1930); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v.
FinUnson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Reid v. knock" basis on October 7, 1988,1 at approxMutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 8%, 899 imately 11:30 p.m. When police entered
(Utah 1989); In re Estate of BarteU, 776 P.2d 885, Swickey's apartment, they found eight people,
886 (Utah 1989).
in addition to Swickey, in the home. Everyone
except defendant was in the living room
playing cards around a table. Defendant was
in the kitchen. After securing the home, the
Cite as
officers had defendant join the other people in
154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
the living room, while Swickey was taken into
the kitchen and placed undeT arrest, pursuant
IN T H E
to an arrest warrant, and advised of the search
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
warrant. Another individual was arrested when
the officers saw drugs nearby, in plain view.
STATE of Utah,
The remaining individuals, including defenPlaintiff and Appellee,
dant, were told they could leave the premises.
v.
Defendant did not have her shoes, and asked
Keeley Laursen ROWE,
if she could go to the bedroom to retrieve
Defendant and Appellant.
them. An officer accompanied her to the
room, where she took the shoes from a pile of
No. 890396-CA
items. The officer asked her if she had everyFILED: February 8,1991
thing that was hers from that room. Defendant replied that she did.
Fifth District, Washington County
After defendant left, the officers conducted
Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite (Circuit
a search of the home. Narcotics were found
Court Judge, sitting by special assignment)
throughout the house. A purse was seized
ATTORNEYS:
from the pile in the bedroom from which
defendant had retrieved her shoes. Inside the
Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant
purse was a small brown vial which contained
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
methamphetamine. Also in the purse were
Lake City, for Appellee
several documents that revealed that the purse
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
belonged to defendant.
Police contacted defendant the next day and
ORME, Judge:
advised her that they had a purse that beloDefendant appeals her conviction of posse- nged to her. She came down to the station and
ssion of a controlled substance, a third degree was arrested. After being advised of her Miranfelony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58- da rights, defendant admitted that the
purse and vial of drugs were hers. She told
37-8(2)(a)(i), (b)(ii) (1989). We reverse.
police that she had been "ripping off" drugs
FACTS
from Swickey.
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant was
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to
issued and executed which authorized police to suppress the vial and other contents seized
search for narcotics in the residence of Stan from her purse. The motion was accompanied
Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The warrant conta- by a memorandum of points and authorities.
ined provisions which allowed police to enter The state filed a memorandum opposing def"day or n i g h t / and to effect the search endant's motion to suppress, and requested a
without notice, i.e., on a "no-knock" basis. ruling on defendant's motion. On March 17,
The warrant was issued based on information 1989, the court issued a written order denying
in the officer's supporting affidavit that a defendant's motion.
confidential informant had been contacted by
Defendant waived her right to a jury trial,
Swickey, who told the informant that he, and a bench trial commenced on March 21,
Swickey, had picked up a quantity of metha- 1989. During the trial defendant again
mphetamine and marijuana that was being renewed her motion to suppress. The basis of
stored at his home in Leeds. The affidavit in her argument was that the search warrant was
support of the warrant contained preprinted defective since the supporting affidavit did not
language which stated that the affiant reaso- support the nighttime or "no-knock" authorization. The state argued that "Mr. Swickey
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knock" warrant is justified if the affidavit
suggests that a small, readily disposable,
quantity of drugs in a residence is the object
of the search.3 The magistrate can readily and
properly infer that such drugs could be quickly
destroyed if notice is given. State v. Spisak,
520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974); State v. Miller, 740
P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). While a
detailed and factually specific affidavit is
commendable and may facilitate subsequent
review by an appellate court, it is not strictly
necessary for the officer to elaborate on the
obvious in the affidavit.
NIGHTTIME SEARCH
Defendant also argues that the supporting
affidavit lacked sufficient factual information
to support a nighttime search. Utah Code
Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990) provides in pertinent part:
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served
in the daytime, unless the affidavits
or oral testimony state a reasonable
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being concealed,
destroyed, damaged or altered, or
for other good reason; in which
case he may insert a direction that it
be served any time of the day or
night.
Previous Utah case law on this issue construed
a different code provision which required that
a warrant be served in the daytime "unless the
affidavits are positive that the property is on
the person or in the place to searched." Utah
Code Ann. §77-54-11 (1953). See, e.g., State v.
Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d
846, 848-49 (1972). No Utah cases are drawn
to our attention which have addressed the
present code provision.
The showing required by the present statute
focuses not upon a positive showing that the
property is at the place to be searched, but
upon whether there are special circumstances
which would justify a search at night. The
statute does not specify how elaborate or
detailed this showing must be, but merely
requires that the "affidavits or oral testimony"
must support a "reasonable cause" determination that a nighttime search is necessary. The
precise quantum of information which would
support this determination is not defined in
the statute or in Utah case law and, as has
been observed elsewhere, it is difficult "to
anticipate all of the numerous factors that
may justify the authorization of a nighttime
search." People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749
P.2d 803, 810, 244 Cal. Rptr. 48, cert, denied,
109 S.Ct. 188 (1988). Nonetheless, the statute
clearly requires a particularized showing either
that 1) a search is required in the night
because the property is on the verge of being

would be the only one to have standing to
object to that," and also argued the merits of
the claim. The court denied the renewed
motion. Defendant was convicted as charged.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal, all
of which challenge the district court's failure
to suppress the items seized from defendant's
purse: 1) Whether there was sufficient factual
information in the supporting affidavit to
authorize a nighttime search, 2) whether there
was sufficient factual information in the supporting affidavit to authorize a "no-knock"
search, and 3) whether the search was defective since the warrant was dated subsequent to
the search.2
"NO-KNOCK" SEARCH
Defendant argues there was insufficient
factual information presented in the supporting affidavit to justify the inclusion of a "noknock" provision in the search warrant. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
When a search warrant has been
issued authorizing entry into any
building, room, conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant may
use such force as is reasonably
necessary to enter:
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the
warrant that the officer need not
give notice. The magistrate shall so
direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may
result to any person if notice were
given.
The affiant in this case requested a warrant
to search for narcotics believed located in a
residence, by checking a preprinted provision
on the affidavit form. A "no-knock" warrant
was requested based on the affiant's statement
that such narcotics could be easily destroyed.
Defendant argues that this statement alone is
insufficient to justify issuance of a "noknock" warrant. However, reading the affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a
whole," State v. Paul, 225 Neb. 432, 405
N.W.2d 608, 610 (1987) (quoting People v.
Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 35, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 281 (1975)), we conclude that the
magistrate had sufficient basis to issue a "noknock" warrant.
Although the affidavit is sparse, it is clear
that the object of the search was drugs located
in a residence. The small amount of drugs
ordinarily found in a residential setting can be
easily and quickly destroyed with even the
briefest notice. Therefore, issuance of a "noUTAH
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"concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered/
or 2) "for other good reason/ Utah Code
Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990).
Defendant argues that this particularized
showing was not made in this case. We agree.
Nothing in the supporting affidavit supported
the inclusion of the nighttime service authority
other than the preprinted language referred to
above and the information received from the
confidential informant. Contrary to our view
that little more is required to justify a "noknock" warrant than that the search is for
narcotics at a residence, we see nothing inherent in a narcotics search which would necessitate a search at night, even though circumstances can easily be imagined which would
suggest the propriety of such a search being
made at night.4
In interpreting a similar statutory provision
which allows a magistrate to authorize a nighttime search upon a showing of "good
cause," one appellate court observed:
(1) A magistrate cannot make a
neutral and independent determination of whether authorization of
nighttime service is necessary when
faced with only conclusory and
ambiguous allegations in the affidavit; and (2) an affiant's averment
that in his experience (generally)
particular types of contraband are
easily disposed of does not, in
itself, constitute a sufficient
showing for the necessity of a nighttime search: a particular and
specific reason for nighttime service
must be set forth.
People v. Mardian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 16, 34,
121 Cal. Rptr. 269,281 (1975).
In Mardian, the court held that the magistrate had "good cause" to issue a nighttime
search warrant based on information provided
in the affidavit that the contraband was in the
process of being removed from the premises,
and that the occupants would be able to
remove the remainder of the contraband
before a daytime warrant could be served since
the occupants would be leaving at 6:00 a.m. Id.
at 282. See also Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810
(magistrate could infer that persons who had
recently stolen stereo equipment would
attempt to get rid of it quickly, since the theft
was tied to a double homicide); State v. Paul,
225 Neb. 432, 405 N.W.2d 608 (1987)
(affiant's statement that he smelled a strong
odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside
the residence in the afternoon supported an
inference that marijuana was being consumed
and thus destroyed). See generally Annotation,
Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at
Nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951 (1969 & Supp.
1990), 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure §166 (13th ed. 1989); 2 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure §4.7(b) (2d ed. 1987 &
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The affidavit in this case contained no facts
from which a magistrate could infer that the
contraband was likely to be destroyed, concealed, damaged, or altered during the night.
Additionally, we find nothing in the affidavit
from which a magistrate could reasonably
infer that there was any "other good reason"
to justify issuance of a nighttime search
warrant.5 We therefore hold that it was error
for the magistrate to authorize a nighttime
search based on the facts in the affidavit presented to him.
STANDING, ABANDONMENT, "GOOD
FAITH," AND SUPPRESSION
The state argues that any inadequacy in the
warrant is immaterial since 1) defendant has
no standing to challenge the adequacy of the
warrant to search Swickey's apartment since
she was only a guest in the apartment; 2) any
expectation of privacy she had in the contents
of her purse was abandoned when she told the
officer she had everything that was hers when
she departed Swickey's bedroom, leaving the
purse behind; 3) any technical defects in the
warrant were overcome by the officer's good
faith reliance on the warrant in conducting the
search; and 4) any failure of the warrant to
satisfy merely statutory requirements does not
necessitate the suppression of evidence, as
would be the case where constitutional requirements are offended.
A. Standing
In her reply brief, defendant claims the state
did not raise standing at trial. While we reaffirm that such a failure would be fatal to the
state's position, see State v. Marshall, 791
P.2d 880, 885-86 & n.8 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), defendant's claim is not borne out by
the record. As indicated above, the prosecutor
specifically argued that "Mr. Swickey would
be the only one to have standing to object to
[the nighttime and "no-knock" provisions of
the warrant]."
Since the contention was adequately raised
at trial, we now address the state's standing
argument. The state argues that defendant has
no standing to challenge the adequacy of a
warrant authorizing the search of a thirdparty's home since she was only a party guest
in the home. We disagree.
Since the decision in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88
S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it
has been the law that "capacity to
claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends ... upon
whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421,
430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

CODE • co
State v. Rowe
15
Provo, Utah
154 Utah idv. Rep. 12
subjective expectation o f privacy is
interest in the premises and do not
legitimate if it is ["]one that society
have the legal authority to deteris prepared to r e c o g n i z e as
mine who may or may not enter the
'reasonable,!'"] id. at 143-144
household.
n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12, quoting
Id. at 1689.
Katz, supra, at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516
A standing challenge in the search and
(Harlan, J., concurring).
seizure context is resolved by a determination
Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1687 of "whether governmental officials violated
(1990). The state's position that defendant any legitimate expectation of privacy." Rawlfailed to establish standing based on the ings v. Kentucky, 448 U . S . 98, 106 (1980). We
nature of her presence in Swickey's home is conclude that defendant's status as an invited
arguable, but not compelling.
guest in the home vested her with a reasonable
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded expectation of privacy in the home and she
"that Olson's status as an overnight guest is thereby gained sufficient standing to challenge
alone enough to show that he had an expect- the validity of the search warrant and the
ation of privacy in the home that society is resulting search.
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at
B. Abandonment
1688. In this case, the evidence did not estaThe state argues that even if defendant
blish that defendant was an overnight guest in
Swickey's home on the night of the search. might otherwise have standing to challenge the
There is, however, uncontroverted evidence search warrant, she abandoned the purse, and
that defendant had an intimate relationship thus abandoned any standing she might othewith Swickey, which may have continued to rwise have had to challenge the search which
the time of the incident giving rise to this case, resulted in seizure of her purse. We disagree.
"When individuals voluntarily abandon
and had stayed overnight in the home on
several prior occasions. However, the record property, they forfeit any expectation of
lacks facts which would lead to the conclusion privacy in it that they might have had." United
v. Thomas,
864 F.2d 843, 845
that she intended, or might have been invited, States
(D.C.
Cir.
1989)
(quoting
United States v.
to remain overnight on the night of the search.
But as we read Olson, there is no talismanic Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert,
464 U . S . 859 (1983)). However,
significance, in determining standing, to the denied,
"abandonment must be distinguished from a
length of time a social guest is in the home.
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest mere disclaimer of a property interest made to
has such standing, but nothing in Olson sug- the police prior to the search, which under the
gests that a social visit of a duration less than better view does not defeat standing." United
overnight would deprive a guest of standing. States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th
While an overnight stay may connote a qual- Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and
itatively greater expectation of privacy than Seizure §11.3, at 548-49 (1978)).
Whether defendant had abandoned her
some social visits, given the typical characteristics of overnight stays such as showering, purse, under search and seizure analysis, is
changing clothes, and the use of toilet facili- primarily a factual question of intent to volties, the distinction is really more one of untarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of
degree than of kind. For example, the seclu- privacy, which may be inferred from "words
sion extended to a parent who pauses to feed spoken, acts done, and other objective facts."
or diaper an infant while visiting friends Thomas, 864 F.2d at 846 (quoting United
implies a reasonable expectation of privacy, States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
although the visit might be a short one, and 1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d
certainly less than an overnight stay. Visitors 200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment
of comparatively short duration may nap, ordinarily a question for the factfinder to be
change, use the toilet, or dine without any determined from the facts and circumstances).
expectation of interference from the world at The burden of proving abandonment falls on
large. In this case, defendant felt secure the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal. A p p .
enough in the home to remove her shoes, leave 3d 450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and
her purse beyond her view, and roam to must be shown by "clear, unequivocal and
rooms other than where her fellow guests were decisive evidence." Friedman v. United States,
playing cards. Eschewing an analysis based on 347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir. 1965). See also
free access and right to exclude others, the United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270, 274
Olson Court focused on the social tradition (D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 S o .
2d 377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. A p p . 1982). It "is
that
measured from the vantage point" of the
hosts will more likely than not
defendant, and not the police. Narain v. State,
respect the privacy interests of their
79 Md. A p p . 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4
guests, who are entitled to a legiti(1989). "It is only the [defendant's] state of
mate expectation of privacy despite
mind that counts." Id.
the fact that they have no legal
Defendant was allowed to leave the party
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along with Swickey's other guests. She was affidavit's contents. This further persuades us
conducted to the bedroom to retrieve her that reliance on the warrant cannot be termed
shoes and was given the opportunity to claim "reasonable" and thus the Leon exception does
any other property belonging to her. When not apply in this case.
asked by the police officer if anything else
D. Appropriate Remedy
belonged to her, she stated that she had retrHaving so concluded, we must now turn our
ieved everything in the bedroom that was hers.
That repudiation of interest in property attention to whether the warrant's issuance in
located in the bedroom is consistent with a violation of the nighttime search requirements
conclusion of abandonment. It is not, necessitates suppression of the evidence seized,
however, inconsistent with a conclusion of a namely the drugs and other items found in
mere disclaimer of interest to avoid self- defendant's purse. We recognize that mere
incrimination. The • state failed to produce ministerial and technical errors in the preparevidence which would develop this issue and ation or execution of search warrants will not,
perhaps meet its burden of proving abandon- without more, invalidate the warrant. See, e.g.,
ment under search and seizure analysis. Acc- State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah
ordingly, abandonment in the Fourth Amen- 1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce"
rule did not require suppression when no one
dment sense was not established by the state. 6
was at home at the time of the search to
respond to the knock). Cf. State v. Kirn, 70
C. Good Faith
The state further claims the search can be Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989)
validated by the officer's good faith reliance (suppression may be appropriate for violation
on the deficient warrant. United States v. of constitution, statute, or administrative
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-23 (1984). In Leon, regulation).
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
However, where a statute establishes procrule, aimed at deterring unlawful police edures for protection of -substantive rights,
conduct, 7 does not bar evidence obtained by such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of
officers acting in good faith reliance on a the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or
defective warrant.* Id. But the Leon doctrine ministerial in nature and suppression of the
is not without limitations. When the magist- evidence gained from the challenged search is
rate reviewing the affidavit in support of the the appropriate remedy. Away a v. State, 5
search warrant is not presented with sufficient Haw. App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of
facts to determine probable cause, the warrant evidence not particularly described in the
cannot be relied upon by searching officers. Id. warrant required suppression), cert, denied, 67
at 915. We have determined that there was Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v.
nothing in the affidavit in this case that would State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla. Crim. App.
offer any basis to the magistrate for a finding 1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77of probable cause to allow a nighttime search. 23-5 mandates suppression); Stare v. Coyle,
It appears from the record that the endorse- 95 Wash. 2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980)
ment of the nighttime authorization was done (suppression required for violation of notice
in impermissible "rubber stamp" fashion. See requirement). But see State v. Brock, 294 Or.
Aguilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant
The question of the officer's good faith allowing nighttime search without any showing
reliance is subject to de novo determination by of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppthis court. United States v. Frietas, 800 F.2d ression not required, when legislature had
1451, 1454 (9th O r . 1986). The conduct of the considered and declined to enact specific excofficers executing the search warrant must be lusionary rule for such circumstances).
objectively reasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
The historical character of a nighttime
Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous search further persuades us that violation of
statutory directive to present the magistrate the statute requires suppression. See Carroll v.
with "reasonable cause to believe a search is United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)
necessary in the night," Utah Code Ann. §77- (question of reasonableness of a search must
23-5(1) (1990), and then claim that their very be viewed not only from the particular facts,
failure to do so is objectively reasonable but also with an eye toward what was consiconduct on their part. See Leon, 468 U.S. at dered reasonable at the time of the adoption
919 n.20 (objective standard requires reason- of the Fourth Amendment). Searches of
able knowledge of the law by police officers); homes were soundly condemned by the drafUnited States v. Freitas, 650 F. Supp. 1560, ters of the Bill of Rights and under English
1572 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (police agency must common law. 10 See United States ex rel.
train officers, who have obligation to ensure Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3d
that warrant comports with constitutional Cir. 1968). "Night-time search was the evil in
law), afPd, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). In its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pape,
this case, the same officer prepared the affi- 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
davit, secured the warrant, and executed the dissenting). The propriety of executing a
search.9 He had personal knowledge of the search of an occupied dwelling at night is
UTAH ADVAPNCE REPORTS
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"sensitively related to the reasonableness"
prong of the Fourth Amendment. United
States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th
Cir. 1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100
Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry
into an occupied dwelling in the middle of the
night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy
than entry executed during the daytime").
We hold that an unmitigated violation of
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5 (1990), as is
present in this case, requires suppression of all
evidence gained in the search executed pursuant to the defective warrant.M
CONCLUSION
The warrant was unlawful insofar as it
authorized a search at night. Defendant has
standing to challenge that deficiency by virtue
of her status as a guest in the home. The
unlawful search cannot be saved on "good
faith" or abandonment grounds. It follows
that the evidence found in defendant's purse
should have been suppressed. Her conviction
is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
GARFF, Judge (concurring):
I concur in the main opinion but make three
further comments. First, one should not construe the main opinion so broadly as to guarantee every person invited into a home the
type of privacy protected by the fourth amendment. Any number of possibilities arise
where one might be classified as an "invited
guest," but may not necessarily be entitled to a
constitutional expectation of privacy. For
example, a Fuller Brush sales person, invited
into a home to demonstrate a product, may
not have standing to challenge an illegal search
warrant. The emphasis in Olson, as here, is
that the circumstances that create a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the home must be
such that society is prepared to recogmze them
as reasonable. That determination is fact
sensitive and the test need not be overly
complex. In Olson it was the mere fact that
defendant was an overnight guest. As an
overnight guest, he had the reasonable expectation that he and his possessions would not
be disturbed by anyone, and that when he was
asleep and most vulnerable, he would be safe
from any unwarranted intrusion. Although
here we are not sure whether defendant was
intended to be an overnight guest, circumstances suggest that she was in a more privileged
position in the house than a casual, card
playing guest: she had a close relationship with
the home owner, had been there on other
occasions, had free run of the house, and felt
comfortable enough to "make herself at
home," in a literal sense.
The second point I would make is that
whenever a "canned," or preprinted affidavit
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is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an
affirmative responsibility to scrutinize the
factual circumstances justifying the search
warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements
in the affidavit are insufficient. This is particularly critical when the warrant authorizes
nighttime intrusion into a person's home.
Finally, while the analysis in the Appendix
to our opinion is good food for thought in a
case where the state has argued the applicability of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, in joining the court's opinion I
emphasize its narrow application, and in no
sense intimate any view on whether the Leon
exception does or does not make good policy,
much less on whether it should or not have
any vitality under our state constitution. Those
questions are reserved for another day.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
I DISSENT:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

APPENDIX
The Leon Court, perhaps alarmed at
society's prospects of failure in the so-called
"drug war," premised the good faith exception
on expediency. The Court concluded that the
exclusionary rule's sole purpose was to deter
police misconduct. This view minimizes the
history of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and the development of the exclusionary rule itself. Origins of the Fourth Amendment are based not so much upon law enforcement misconduct in executing warrantless
searches, as in concerns about the unreasonable issuance of general search warrants. The
exclusionary rule was born as a constitutional
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment generally, with no particular emphasis on
police behavior.

General Warrants
General warrants have their derivation in
thirteenth century universal authorizations
granted to innkeepers to search guests for
counterfeit currency. Stengel, The Background
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, Part One, 3 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 278, 283 (1969). With the onset of the
Age of Enlightenment and accompanying
reform movements, England's threatened
monarchs issued sweeping general warrants to
search papers, books, and documents for
evidence of sedition and libel against the
Crown. For nearly a century, members of the
private printer's guild used these warrants to
seize and destroy the presses of printers who
failed to join their union. Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1365,1369(1983).
James I, Charles I, and Charles II, rulers
during the seventeenth century, instituted
unprecedented general warrants allowing
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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agents of the notorious Court of the Star
Chamber to search virtually at any time and
any place for seditious printed matter. See Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 726
(1961). Tax collectors were granted general
warrants to enter castles and cottages, at any
time without notice, to enforce the hearth tax.
Not until a revolution which placed a reform
king, William of Orange, upon the throne,
and a suit for trespass by a member of Parliament, did judicial review effectively limit the
reach of general warrants. Chief Justice Pratt
(Lord Camden) concluded in Wilkes v. Wood,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763):
The defendants claimed a right,
under precedents, to force persons
houses, break open escrutores, seize
their papers & c. upon a general
warrant, where no inventory is
made of the things thus taken away,
and where no offenders names are
specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to
messengers to search wherever their
suspicions may chance to fall. [Such
power] is totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject.
Id. at 498. See also Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). These cases were known
to the authors of the Fourth Amendment, and
Wilkes v. Wood is generally regarded to be the
formative inspiration for the passage of the
Fourth Amendment. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616,631 (1886).
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This historical review suggests that the issuance of flawed warrants was of greater
concern to the drafters of the Fourth Amendment than was the conduct of officers
charged with the duty to execute such warrants. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
316 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (describing
the text of the original draft of the Fourth
Amendment).

The Exclusionary Rule
An exclusionary rule was first applied in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). It
is instructive that Boyd involved no issue of
police action or misconduct. The challenge in
Boyd was to a judicially-issued subpoena in a
civil forfeiture case. Paralleling the circumstances under which the writs of assistance were
condemned, Boyd involved a subpoena for
books and papers of merchants accused of
unlawfully importing glass. Id. at 621. The
Supreme Court concluded that because the
papers were sought for what was essentially a
criminal process, forfeiture for customs duties,
the Fourth Amendment applied. However, the
Court did not order suppression directly on
Fourth Amendment grounds. Rather, the
Court reasoned that the forced production of
incriminatory papers and documents would
violate the Fifth Amendment and accordingly
ordered suppression of the material obtained
under the subpoena.
Twenty-two years later, a unanimous
Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), which firmly established the
exclusionary rule as a fundamental principle of
Colonial Writs of Assistance
In the American colonies, particular excep- Fourth Amendment law. Defendant Weeks
tion was taken to the practice of granting writs had been convicted of gambling, on the basis
of assistance to customs officers. These writs, of personal papers which were unlawfully
granted by King George II, were valid for the seized. Before trial, Weeks moved for the
King's lifetime and granted unlimited power return of his illegally seized papers. The Court
to the officers to search at any place and any held that the government was constitutionally
time without the need for judicial review or bound to return the improperly seized docusubsequent proceedings. Stewart, The Road to ments, which could not then be subpoenaed by
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, the prosecution, and reversed Weeks' conviDevelopment and Future of the Exclusionary ction. Id. at 398. See also Schrock & Welsh, Up
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as
a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L.
Colum. L. Rev. 1365,1370(1983).
In 1760, King George II died and new writs Rev. 251, 295-308 (1974) (discussing the
were required. The colonists sought judicial impact of the Weeks decision).
A few years later, the Court decided Silverelief from the new writs. James Otis, a prorthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
minent attorney in the service of the Crown
whose position required him to seek the writs U.S. 385 (1920), and Gouled v. United States,
from the Superior Court, instead resigned his 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The combined cases
post and argued the cause on behalf of sixty- framed the exclusionary rule as barring any
three Boston citizens. N. Lasson, The History use whatsoever of improperly seized evidence.
and Development of the Fourth Amendment Writing for the Court in Si'/verthorne, Justice
to the United States Constitution 58-59 Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: "The essence of
(1937, Johns Hopkins Press; reprinted 1970, a provision forbidding the acquisition of eviDaCapo Press). Years later, John Adams dence in a certain way is that not merely eviclaimed it was James Otis's fiery denunciation dence so acquired shall not be used before the
of general warrants in open court that prov- Court but that it shall not be used at all." 251
ided the spark for the American Revolution. Id. U.S. at 392. Ultimately, and after further
refinement, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was applied to the states through the
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Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643,655 (1961).
Against this background, it would seem
appropriate that courts considering the scope
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule be
mindful of the process of review and issuance
of the warrant, as well as the lawfulness of the
police officer' s execution thereof.
The Trouble with Leon
It is viewed from this historical perspective
that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), represents such a qualitative change in
the development of exclusionary rule jurisprudence. Writing for the Court, Justice White
offered three justifications for the conclusion
that the exclusionary rule was aimed at police
misconduct and had no impact on the judicial
review of warrant applications. First, he declared that the exclusionary rule was not designed to deter judges from error. Id. at 916.
"Second, there exists no evidence suggesting
that judges and magistrates are inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment ...."
Id. Finally, and "most important," judges are
neutral judicial officers, not adjuncts to law
enforcement administration, and the exclusionary rule will have no practical deterrent
effect on them. Id. at 916-17.
The first and third assertions seem at odds
with the fact that the exclusionary rule, as first
"designed" in Boyd, was expressly created as a
remedy for judicial error. Moreover, these
assertions discount the historical concerns
about the issuance of general warrants and
writs of assistance. In the instant case, there is
no allegation of police misconduct in the
warrant application process. The defect in the
warrant might have been easily cured by
careful questioning by an attentive magistrate.
This is likely the more common scenario when
a warrant's validity is challenged. See State v.
Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 67
(1990). Often the reviewing judge will simply
evaluate the warrant application for gross
errors of law or something out of the ordinary, acting, in effect, as a rubber stamp. See
Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1173, 1182(1987); Wasserstrom <ft Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But
Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Grim. L. Rev.
85, 108-09 (1984) (citing statistical evidence
of lax warrant review standards). Much of the
exclusionary rule's vigor prior to Leon was in
requiring the magistrate to assiduously exercise
his or her Fourth Amendment duty by carefully scrutinizing warrant applications.
Justice White's second assertion, if true,
calls into serious question the practical need
for the Leon exception to the exclusionary
rule. He gives high marks to judges and
magistrates, claiming that few issue warrants
not firmly grounded in probable cause. If
indeed this is so, but see id., the exclusionary
UTAH

rule would almost never be invoked in warrantbased searches, even without the Leon doctrine, since the magistrate will have scrutinized
the application and issued the warrant only
upon a detailed and well-supported showing
of probable cause. Thus, the societal costs of
the exclusionary rule, a great concern for the
Leon Court, will be minuscule in the context
of cases where a warrant is obtained.
It may additionally be questioned whether
the societal costs of the exclusionary rule are
as onerous as Justice White believes them to
be. The Leon Court reasoned that the
"marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence ... cannot justify the
substantial costs of Exclusion." 468 U.S. at
922. But several scholars who have examined
Leon's "economic" conclusions refute them as
groundless in fact. See Nardulli, The Societal
Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987
U. 111. L. Rev. 223, 239 (exclusionary rule
accounts for less than two percent of case
attrition); 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure
§1.3 at 46 n.5 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
Moreover, while the societal cost of suppressing evidence may in some respects be more
tangible-it surely prompts an understandable visceral reaction by many--the
system's use of illegally obtained evidence is
not without societal costs of its own. True, it
may be, that freeing a criminal because the
constable (or magistrate) erred is not an entirely satisfactory state of affairs. But in a
society committed to the notion that governmental action as well as citizen behavior is
subject to the rule of law, it should also be
regarded as an unsatisfactory state of affairs
to countenance the use of evidence that should
not have been uncovered, under our rules, to
convict a citizen of some crime.
We believe the exclusionary rule may well
have, as a substantial purpose, the objective of
requiring careful judicial scrutiny of warrant
applications. Simply put, it is unlikely magistrates are any more pleased to have their
warrants "thrown out" by reviewing courts
than are the police to have their evidence
"thrown out." Such stimulation extends also
to appellate review. Rigorous appellate review
of search warrants and the accompanying
benefit of defining search and seizure law
would be effectively precluded if Leon were
given wide rein, as the court would have little
occasion to proceed beyond an inquiry into
the trial court's finding of the officer's good
faith. Similarly, issuing magistrates who are
less than zealous in their devotion to the
Fourth Amendment would have little motivation to look beyond the face of the warrant,
knowing that as long as the warrant is facially
proper, the appellate court would not interfere
in view of the officer's good faith in executing
a facially proper warrant.
Were an officer permitted to rely on a facially valid warrant without more being requZE REPORTS

ired of him or her, there would be no incentive for advanced training which would enable
officers to better fulfill their duty to uphold
the constitutions of the United States and of
this state. Moreover, the well-trained officer
or prosecutor securing a warrant will be in a
position to prevent the very harm which led to
the good faith exception. An officer who is
motivated to prepare a constitutionally adequate warrant application will be less likely to
rush through a warrant application, and will
more carefully evaluate the sufficiency of
probable cause, so that the warrant will withstand ultimate review and not merely gain the
signature of an issuing magistrate. Similarly,
the prosecutors who must argue the validity of
warrants in court will be circumspect in their
assessment of the sufficiency of probable
cause when asked for advice before a warrant
application is presented.
Fourth Amendment Conclusion
It may be persuasively argued that the exclusionary rule serves purposes beyond influencing the behavior of individual officers and
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 975-80 (1984) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting justifications for exclusionary
rule not tempered with "good faith" exception
as also including assurance of some remedy
for violation of constitutional rights and as
placing judiciary beyond the "dirty business"
of using the fruits of unlawful searches to
secure convictions). But insofar as its purpose
is to influence behavior, the rule can serve to
promote discipline, thoroughness, and care on
the part of all actors in the process-police
who secure warrants, prosecutors who aid in
that process, magistrates who issue warrants,
and police who execute warrants. Any exception to the rule which focuses on the rule's
impact on only one of those groups, officers
who carry out searches, is open to legitimate
criticism.
As and when the appellate courts of this
state are squarely confronted with the question
of whether the exclusionary rule existing by
virtue of Article I, Section 14, of the Utah
Constitution is subject to a Leon-type "good
faith" exception, a healthy skepticism should
permeate the courts' consideration in view of
the troublesome analysis in Leon.
1. While the date on the search warrant and supporting affidavit is October 8, 1988, it is clear from
trial testimony that this was an error, and the date
of issuance was actually October 7.
2. Defendant addresses the third contention in a
cursory, one paragraph argument. She cites no
authority for her position that the erroneous date
invalidates the warrant, nor does she respond to
testimony given at trial that the date the warrant
was issued was actually October 7, 1988. We therefore decline to address this issue.
3. A more particularized showing may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is
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sought. In such cases, as where the affiant has information of the on-going cultivation or manufacture of drugs, the exigency of ready destructability,
inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be
present.
4. For example, if the supporting affidavit made a
particularized showing that drugs were likely to be
sold or consumed over the course of the night and
evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely
to be imminently moved en masse to a different
location during the night, or that a safer search was
likely at night because the house was abustlc with
activity during the day and no one but the occupant
was likely to be home at night, then the propriety of
a nighttime search becomes manifest. We caution
that a mere incantation of such circumstances will
not justify a nighttime search-the required
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for
example, to preprinted language. Officers must
"state a reasonable cause to believe a [nighttime]
search is necessary ...." Utah Code Ann. §77-235(1990).
5. Though we find it unnecessary to define what
"other good reason'' might encompass, but see note
4, supra, clearly one reason why a nighttime search
might be authorized is where a nighttime search
would increase the safety of the officers executing
the warrant or the safety of the general public.
Of course, ordinarily a nighttime search would
pose a heightened safety risk since people may tend
to overreact to an entry by force in the dead of
night. Darkness may exacerbate the reaction or
heighten the confusion inherent in a search, especially one conducted on a "no-knock" basis. Nonetheless, a specific showing that the safety of the
public or the officers will be increased has been held
a sufficient basis for a search at night. See, e.g., Kimble, 749 P.2d at 810 (magistrate could conclude
that permitting police to expedite their investigation
was an exceptionally compelling reason to allow a
nighttime search where dangerous killer or killers
were still at large). We note that other courts have
rejected less compelling kinds of "other good
reason," such as because "appellant did not get
home until '6:00 or after* and that appellant was
not always present at his house," People v. Watson,
75 Cal. App. 3d 592, 595, 142 Cal. Rptr. 245, 246
(1978); because the officerapplying for the warrant
"was on duty at night," Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d
115, 116-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); and because
"it [was] unknown when the person described [in the
affidavit] will be at the premises." State v. Lien, 265
N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. 1978).
6. It is not entirely clear that even if the state had
proven abandonment defendant would be deprived
of standing to challenge the seizure of her purse.
"Property abandoned as a direct result of an unlawful intrusion into a person's right to be free from
governmental interference cannot be lawfully
seized." State v. Nichols, 563 So. 2d 1283, 1286-87
(La. Ct. App. 1990). See also United States v.
Roman, 849 F.2d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir.
1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); State v.
Jones, 553 So. 2d 928, 931 (La. Ct. App. 1989);
Sarain v. State, 79 Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158,
1160-61 (1989); State v. Heuther, 453 N.W.2d 778,
781-82 (N.D. 1990); State v. Whitaker, 795 P.2d
182, 183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Under this view,
even if defendant abandoned her purse, she still
would have standing since the abandonment was
precipitated by an unlawful search of the residence
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in which her purse was located.
employed to insulate the affiant from actual service
7. Many have questioned the Leon Court's narrow of the warrant in order to support a claim of good
interpretation of the exclusionary rule's purpose. See, faith reliance by executing officers, we would not
e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928- hesitate to fashion an appropriate remedy. See State
60 (1984) (Brcnnan, J., dissenting); id. at 960-80 v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Novembrino, 105 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (where officers purpN.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 853-57 (1987); 1 W. osefully serve a search warrant in order to avoid
LaFave, Search & Seizure §1.3, at 46 n.5 (1987) giving notice of authority and purpose, court will
(citing extensive critical authority); Wasserstrom & fashion a judicial remedy).
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: 10. In an often-quoted speech condemning general
But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 85, warrants, Lord Chatham stated:
106-07 (1984). See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d
The poorest man may, in his cottage,
181, 185 & n.2 (Utah 1987) (criticizing the breadth
bid defiance to all forces of the Crown.
of the language in Leon). The Leon rationale,
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
viewed from a historical perspective, is treated at
wind may blow through it; the storm
greater length in the Appendix to this opinion.
may enter; but the King of England may
8. We note that neither party addressed Utah's
not enter; all his forces dare not cross
exclusionary rule, premised on Article I, Section 14,
the threshold of the ruined tenement.
of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 1 T. Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional LimitatP.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) ("exclusion of illegally ions 611 (8th ed. 1927). See also Appendix to this
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of opinion.
police violations of article I, section 14."). To date,
neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this court has 11. It may well be that section 77-23-5 merely
held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception codifies that which is already required under the
would apply in the context of Utah's exclusionary Fourth Amendment. See Gooding v. United States,
rule. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting)
1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (Court has not (principle of requiring a showing of particularized
yet considered Leon-type exception under Article I, need to conduct a nighttime search may now be a
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution). See also State "constitutional imperative"). See also State v.
v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 809 (Utah Ct. App. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
1988) (concluding in dicta that Mendoza did not (Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 codifies constitutiinvalidate applicability of Leon). Many state courts onal requirements for investigative stops). But see
have determined that exclusionary rules existing by Davis & Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the
virtue of state constitutional provisions are not Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in
subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception. See, Utah, 3 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 357, 363 (1989) (section
e.g., State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 77-7-15 requirement is more strict than the
58, 68 (1990); People v. Sundling, 153 Mich. App. Fourth Amendment).
277, 395 N.W.2d 308, 315 (1986), appeal denied,
428 Mich. 887 (1987); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709,
370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); State v. Novembrino, 105
N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987); People v.
Cite as
Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58
154 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
(1985). At least one court has construed a statutory
exclusionary rule to reject the Leon exception. See,
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370
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n.5,476 N.E.2d 548, 554 n.5 (1985).
Notwithstanding any dicta to the contrary in our STATE of Utah,
decision in State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 809
Plaintiff and Appellee,
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), it is far from clear whether
v.
the Leon exception has any vitality under a state law
Jeffery
GLORIOSO,
analysis, especially since the basis and scope of our
Defendant and Appellant.
state exclusionary rule is somewhat unsettled. See
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472-73 (Utah
1990). There may well be sound reasons for state No. 900170-CA
court interpretation at variance with the federal FILED: February 11, 1991
search and seizure rules. See generally, Durham,
Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah B.J. 25
ORDER
(Nov. 1989); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
Before
Judges
Bench,
Jackson and Orme (On
1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8
(Utah 1988). See also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, Law and Motion).
104-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Billings, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[sjtate courts responding to
This matter is before the Court upon appthe confusing and restrictive new federal interpretellee's
motion to allow Todd Utzinger, a law
ations are relying on an analysis of their own search
and seizure provisions to expand constitutional student, to argue on behalf of appellee at the
protection beyond those mandated by the fourth hearing scheduled herein on 20 February 1991.
amendment, often directly avoiding applicable Appellant stipulated to the motion.
United States Supreme Court precedent").
The law student assistance rule, Rule 119. We hasten to caution that the objective reasona- 301 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professibleness of both the affiant officers and the executing
officers must be considered in any review where the
Leon doctrine is asserted. Were a subterfuge to be
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